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Abstract 
The MFN Clause has been subject to a change in interpretation an application following a series 
of cases arising from the both courts and tribunals. This study evaluates the history of the MFN 
Clause and contrasts it to its contemporary interpretation and application. The core objective 
is to ascertain the role of the MFN clause with regards to BITs. This will inform the 
recommendations on the potential redefinition of the clause or the removal of the protection 
from BITs in its entirety. The scope of the study will be limited to BITs as they are the key 
tool utilised to fi.irther development thorough foreign direct investment in developing countries. 
As such it is more often than not the case that -the two parties in the BIT are a developed state 
and a developing state. The key methods used to obtain the findings are desktop research of 
cases seen to provide the most cogent justification for the conditional extension of the MFN 
clause. 
Themajorfindingwas,.the large acceptance of the substantive protection ofMFN ..clauses, may 
be extended to include procedural advantages. This extension is justified where it is proved to 
provide more favourable conditions for investment. A narrow application of the clause in such 
an instance would be classed as a breach of the inextricable rights owed to investors under the 
BIT. This study suggests that the best remedy for this potentially detrimental application of 
the clause would be either to adopt an expressly open .or limited MFN clause. However, the 
best possible remedy would be to do away with the MFN Clause in the context of BITs and 
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CHAPTER ONE 
. History of the MFN Clause 
1. Background 
A bilaterar investment treaty (BIT), is an international agreement between two states for the 
Protection and Promotion of Investments made by private individuals or private companies. 1 
This is different from multilateral investment treaties (MITs) which are seen to be established 
for the same investment purposes but have more than two sovereigns as parties.2 The term 
·bilateral connotes that the agreement is between two countries where one state is acting as the 
Host State and another is acting as an Investor State. 3 The key purpose of these treaties is to 
assist "developed~ capital-exporting states to ensure that their nationals are financially and 
legally protected when investing in developing, capital-importing states.4" This overriding 
objective has transcend the ages and contributed to an increase in the number of BITs signed 
between states. 5 
The first recording of the Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFN) as a. protection, was in the 'Ads 
Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign 
Countries 1956.'6 The MFN provision at Article 4 of the Ads Draft stated "In so far as better 
treatment is promised to non-nationals than to nationals either under intergovernmental or other 
agreements or by administrative decrees of one ofthe High contracting Parties, including most-
favoured nation clauses, such promises shall prevail. 7'' This provision went on to influence the 
Abs~Shawcross Draft Convention on Foreign Investment 1959.8 Article 3 of the Abs.:Shawcross 
draft convention provided as follows "Each Party shall at all times ensure the observance of 
1 Parker, S.L, 'A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties.' The Arbitration Brief 2, (20 12), 31. 
2 https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/dynamic/guide.php?id=65 on 19 February 2017. 
3 https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/dynarnic/guide.php?id=65 on 19 February 2017. 
4 https://www.iisd.org/investment/law/treaties.aspx accessed on 17/01/17 ; Juillard P, 'Bilateral Investment 
Treaties In The Context Oflnvestrnent Law'9 (2001)1. 
5 https://www.iisd.org/investrnent/law/treaties.aspx accessed on 17/01/17; Juillard P, 'Bilateral Investment 
Treaties In The Context Of Investment Law'9 (2001) 2. 
6 Katia Yannaca~Small, 'International Investment · Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations' 
(2008), 103. 
7 Katia Yannaca-Small, 'International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations' 
(2008), 103. . 
8 Katia Yannaca-Small, 'International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations' 
(2008), 103. 
1 
any undertakings which it may have_given in relation to investments made by nationals of any 
other party. 
lt was with this guidance that the MFN clause was incorporated into the first BIT between 
Germany and Pakistan in 1959.9 This protection still remains at Article 7 in the cunent 
Germany- Pakistan BIT of 2009. 10 Due regard is given to this codification of MFN protection, 
as it led to the advancement of diplomatic relations between sovereigns with a shared interest 
to promote and protect cross-border investments. 11 
. MFN clauses in BITs have .been seen to come into .play in two instances. Firstly, .substantive 
protection, where an investor seeks to ensure that their investments are protected and they 
receive all substantive favourable treatment accorded to other investors. Secondly, where they 
wish to import a procedural advantages from 3rd party BITs that their host state have signed. 12 
This was first discussed in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case heard in the International Court 
of Justice. in 1952. 13 In this instance the UnitedKingdom in a dispute with Iran sought to rely 
on a BIT signed between Iran and Denmark.14 The dispute centred on, Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment being denied to the Anglo h·anian Oil Company in accordance with practice and 
principles of intemationallaw. 15 The tribunal in this instance held that "A third-party treaty, 
independent of and isolated from the basic treaty, cannot produce any legal effect as between 
the United Kingdom and Iran. 16" Thus establishing the MFN clause found in .the treaty in 
question would not be used to bonow the procedural protections from a 3rd party treaty. It 
would not be extended to include the procedural advantages that the United Kingdom sought 
to enforce. 17 Procedural protection is to be understood as borrowing a favourable dispute 
resolution mechanism from other BITs signed by the host state and other sovereigns. 
Substantive Protection is to be understood as, favourable treatment of their investments such 
as tariffs and tax exemptions that other investors receive. Such treatment is given to both 
9Katia Yannaca-Small, 'International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations' 
(2008), 104. 
10 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/1 733 on 30 January 2017. 
11 http://investrnentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IlA/mappedContent/treaty/1733 on 21 February 2017 
12 Barber Lowse :. 'Cart B.efore the Horse; Can.MFN Clauses Expand the Key Definitions in Investment Treaties?' 
Kluwer arbitration blog, (2014) available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/20 14/09/02/ca1t-before-the-horse-
can-mfn-clauses-expand-the-key-definitions-in-investrnent-treaties/ on 17 January 17. 
13 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (United Kingdom v. Iran) Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 93. 
14 Banifatemi Yas, 'The Emerging Jurisprudence On The Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment In Investment 
Arbitration', Shearman &sterling, (2009), 2. 
15 http: //www.icj-cij .org/docket/index.php?sum=82&p I =3&p2=3&case=16&p3=5 on 14 March 2017. 
16 Banifatemi Yas, 'The Emerging Jurisprudence On The Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment In Investment 
Arbitration', 4. 
17 http://www.icj-cij .org/docket/index.php?sum=82&p I =3&p2=3&case= !6&p3=5 on 14 March 2017. 
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national investors and to foreign direct investors who gain protection through other BITs signed 
. by the host state. 
1.2. Statementofthe problem 
The application of the. MFN clause in BIT's has historically only applied to the substantive 
treatment of the investors and their investments. However, given the difference in material 
construction of the MFN clauses it has led to what was purely a substantive protection, gaining 
a procedural element. This procedural advantage has been used to facilitate treaty and forum 
shopping. Essentially, going against the sentiments of the ICJ in the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company case. It .is due to this that the exact nature and scope of both protections has since 
become muddled in uncertainty. Whereas initially the parties' investments were sufficiently 
protected by the MFN Clause, it may now facilitate greater difficulty particular in the dispute 
resolution mechanisms negotiated into the BIT 
1.3. Justification of the study 
The import of this study is seen in the ever growing number of BITs signed by sovereigns. 18 
Such may be seen from the example of Kenya, which has signed seventeen BITs (as of the 
writing of this study). 19To continue with the example of Kenya, understanding the 
consequences of a poorly worded MFN clause is crucial as this may have a detrimental effect 
for the still developing economy.2° Consequently, the effects of such clauses may lead to 
penalties that are felt by both developed countries if not mitigated.21 
The inclusion of the MFN Clause has remained in effect due to its extensive substantive 
protection as is evidenced by its inclusion in every BIT ratified by Kenya.22 The underpinning 
of this being need for equality of protections for all foreign investors. 23 Due to the inconsistency 
in wording of the actual clause, there has been much confusion as to the proper use ofMFN as 
a substantive and in certain circumstances procedural protection.24 This has also been 
·occasioned by the difference in decisions reached by courts and tribunals charged with 
18 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.orgillA/CountryBits/1 08 on 08/02/17 on 8 February 17 
19 http://investmentpolicyhub.tmctad.oqyTIA/CountryBits/1 08 on 08/02/17 on 8 February 17. 
2° Kerner A, "why should I believ you? The costs and consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties"Intemational 
studies quarterly Emory University, (2009) . 
21 Xerner A, ''why should 1 believ you?The costs and consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties"International 
studies quarterly Emory University, (2009). 
22 http://investrnentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ITA/CountryBits/l08 on 08/02/17 on 8 February 17. 
23 Barclay Thomas 'Most-Favoured-Nation" Clause in Commercial Treaties' 
24 Barclay Thomas 'Most~ Favoured-Nation" Clause in Commercial Treaties', The Yale Law Journal, (1967), 26-
32. 
3 
determining the appropriate application ofthe clause.25 The main peculiarity of such decisions 
is apparent in that they are final and binding yet the tribunal itself is only bound by the treaty. 26 
As such the current study may be seen as doubly cruciaL Firstly, in its investigation on the 
possible consequence of tribunal decisions like the one seen in Maffezini. Secondly, the effect 
it has on the future drafting or inclusion ofMFN clauses in BITs. 
1.4. Hypothe~is 
The hypothesis going into the study is as follows; 
1. The history ofthe MFN clause will show its growth in use as a means to liberalize trade, 
2. The continued appearance ofMFN clauses in BITs' is based on the need to ensure that 
all investors and their investments are accorded the proper substantive protections as 
agreed within the BIT, 
3. It is essentially irreplaceable in the grand scheme of furthering foreign direct investment 
and furthering the economy of the host state, 
4. The removal of the MFN clause from BITs will provide the much needed clarity and 
uniformity in the grand scheme of international investment policy. Furthermore, given 
· the fact that the MFN clause is not considered international customary law it will be 
correct to state that the parties will not be in contravention ofthe customary principles 
of international law. 
1.5. Statement of objective(s) 
This study has one core objective, namely to define the proper use of the substantive and 
procedural protection ofMFN clauses. The core objective may be informed by investigating; 
I. The reasons why MFN clauses are still considered an essential protection in BITs, 
2. What may be the effect of the removal of the MFN clause from BITs, 
3. Whether such effect will be favourable to the promotion and protection of 
investments, 
4. The possible detriments if any to the efficacy of BITs. 
1.6. Research Questions 
This study will address the following intetTelated research questions; 
1. What is the history of the MFN Clause in international investment law? 
25 Barclay T 'Most-Favoured~Nation" Clause in Commercial Treaties', 26-32. 
26 Dixon M, 'International law' Oxford University Press, 2013,151. 
2. What is the theoretical justification ofthe MFN clause? 
3. What may acritical analysis of case law in various courts and tribunals demonstrate 
about the evolution of the MFN Clause? 
4. What consequences have come about due to the mixed interpretation of the MFN 
clause? 
5. Recommendations and conclusion 
1 ~7. Literature Review 
Vesel notes that from their historic origin, MFN clauses have come to be considered the 
"cornerstone of all modem commercial treaties."27 Where they were once seen to be applied in 
consular relations they have since become a core element of international investment 
agreements, such speaks to their continued use due to tradition.28 He asserts the historical 
purpose of the MFN Clause, was to magnify and strengthen the European powers and :fiuther 
magnify the weakness of the states subject to these agreements.29 
European powers utilized unilateral agreements where they obtained the necessary concessions 
for all European investors whilst the weak party in the agreement was made to provide the 
concessions to all · investors who came under the agreement. 30 This was the case till China and 
Belgium conflicted over the essentially one sided benefits ofthe agreements.31 China was seen 
to issue a public statement stating as follows, "The 'unequal treaties' which were exacted from 
China nearly a century ago have stablished between Chinese and foreigners discriminations 
that are now sources of endless discontent and friction with foreign powers. 32 Such a state of 
affairs is not as it should be, since intercourse between nations, as between individuals, finds 
its rational motif in the exchange of mutual benefits which will endure and lead to lasting 
friendship.33 In an age which has witnessed the coming into existence of the League ofNations 
27 Scott Vesel, 'Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured~Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties', Yale Journal of International Law, 2007, 10. 
28 Vesel, 'Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in .Bilateral Investment Treaties', 10 
-29 Vesel, 'Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties', 12. 
30 Vesel, 'Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
SettlementProvisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties', 12. 
31 Vesel, 'Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties', 12. 
32 Statementofthe Chinese Government, 1929 P.C.l.J., No. 16-1, at271 (Nov. 6), 167. 
33 Ustor E, 'First report on the most-favoured-nation clause', International Law Commission Yearbook, Vol. ll 
(1969) 
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... there does not seem to be any valid reason to justify international relations which are not 
founded on equality and mutuality. 34" 
Such is the background of the first dispute focussing on MFN clauses, namely the Anglo 
Iranian Oil Case.35 The pertinence of this study to the present study is its chronology on the 
pre-codification of the MFN clause. This provides both history and insight on the jurisprudence 
of the clause from its original understanding to its current understanding.36 
Thulasidhass discusses the possibility of attaining uniformity and consistency through the use 
of interpretive rules such as ejusdem generis (words ofthe_same kind), questioning presumptive 
approaches, recognising relative autonomy of treaty components, and balancing conceptual 
evolution over textual interpretation.37 In his analysis on the effects ofthe ejusdem generisrule, 
Thulasidhass posits that this rule of interpretation shall lead to a limited understanding and 
application of the MFN clause. He cites The Ambatielos Claim where the ICJ was seen to state 
that the MFN clause can only "attract matters belonging to the same category of subject as that 
to which th~ clause itselfrelates.38" Such understanding effectively leads to the non-expansion 
of the clause unless parties to the dispute otherwise opt to have the clause structured in a manner 
that would facilitate such expansion. However, it is key to not that this means of interpretation 
may be seen as too restrictive by some but in effect provides for the absolute certainty on the 
function of such protections in treaties. 
Thulasidhass concludes by suggesting that the "interpretative discretion of investment 
tribunals" is key in understanding how the MFN clause ought not to be interpreted. 39 He also 
calls for caution going forward, that tribunals seek not to add on to the negative uniformity in 
their interpretation of principles of international investment. 40 There appears to be a move 
towards conservancy within the ICJ whilst other tribunals are seen to construe the MFN clauses 
with less restraint. This study proposes to advance the views of the ICJ as they may be seen to 
34 Statement of the Chinese Government, 167. 
35 Vesel, 'Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most"Favoured-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in.Bilateral Investment Treaties', 13. 
36Thulasidhass, 'Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining the Limits 
through Interpretative Principles' 17. 
37Thulasidhass, 'Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining the Limits 
through Interpretative Principles', 17. 
38 Ambatielos, Greece v. U.K., Judgment, (1953) ICJ 10, May 19. 
39 Thulasidhass, "Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining the Limits 
through Interpretative Principles", Amsterdam Law Forum, (2015), 1. 
40Thulasidhass, "Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining the Limits 
through Interpretative Principles", Amsterdam Law Fomm, (2015), 1. 
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be promoting certainty in the use of the clause rather than providing awards/decisions based on 
the exercise of discretion. 
1.8. Theoretical Framework 
The effectiveness of the MFN clause may rightly be discussed within the economic theory of 
comparative advantage schooL 41 Raz rightly observed "every law necessarily belongs to a 
legal system" and as a protection seen in treaties it is safe to say that the MFN clause belongs 
within the international law system.42 Comparative advantage theory has its roots in absolute 
advantage as espoused by Adam Smith. 43 Absolute advantage instructs countries to specialize 
in production of what they are most efficient at making and exchange that product or service 
with other countries.44 Comparative advantage adds on to this by instructing countries to not 
only produce that which they have an absolute advantage over but even goods that they may 
have a comparative advantage over.45 This is best understood through an illustration, "Country 
A is more efficient than Country B at producing both commodities X and Y, it will pay the 
citizens of Country A to specialize in producing X, which it is most best at producing, and buy 
all of commodity Y from Country B, which it is better at producing but does not have as great 
a comparative advantage as in making commodity X"46 The key difference between the two is 
that "comparative advantage implies an opportunity cost associated with the production of one 
good compared to another.'>47 This theory explains the division of labour through specialist 
production.48 With regard to BITs, this theory lends itself as a justification of ~hat why 
extension of the MFN clause may indeed be permitted. Simply, there is a comparatively better 
procedural protection in a 3rd party BIT as opposed to the basic BIT. 
41 Priel Dan, 'Toward Classical Legal Positivism, Australian Society of Legal Philosophy' Australian Society of 
Legal Philosophy, (2012), 13. 
42Raz Joseph, 'The Concept of a Legal System: AnJntroduction to the Theory of Legal System', Oxford UniverSity 
Press, London, 1980, 1. · 
43 https://mises.org/library/ricardian-law-comparative-advanta[!e on 19 December 2017. 
44 https://mises.org/library/ricardian-law-comparative-advantage on 19 December 2017. 
45 https://rnises.org/library/ricardian-law-comparative-advantage on 19 December 2017. 
46 Rehim Kth,c, 'Absolute and Comparative Advantage: Ricardian Model' Michigan State University, June 2002, 
5. 
47 Rehim Kth,c, 'Absolute and Comparative Advantage: Ricardian Model' Michigan State University, June 2002, 
10. 
48 https://mises.org/library/ricardiau-law-comparative-advantage on 19 December 2017. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Framework of the MFN Clause 
2. Introduction 
This chapter shall explore the appropriate understanding of the MFN clause through the theory 
of Comparative. advantage. This. discussion will begin with a detailing of the trends that pushed 
liberalization oftrade. It is from this liberalization that the growth in the use of the MFN clause 
was seen. The objective being to ascertain the proper object and purpose of the MFN clause. 
As the world moved away from the colonial period and anti-colonial rhetoric began to grow.49 
The need for a concretized legal framework for protection of foreign investors became more 
pronounced as newly established independent states began to nationalise foreign property so 
as to recoup their forcefully expropriated wealth. 5° Following the destruction that was seen 
through the world after World War II, liberalization of trade was seen as a means to return the 
countries most affected to their original place, prevent nationalism and hostile retribution.51 
The two main principles that were seen to further the efforts and have contributed significantly 
to their success include, 52 
1. The non-discrimination principle - This stipulates that both trade restrictions and 
proposals to reduce trade restrictions should apply to all of a country's trading partners 
equally, and that imported goods and services will not be treated differently than 
domestic ones. Which can be seen through the national treatment clause and fair and 
equitable treatment clause. 53 
2. The principle of reciprocity - all participating countries offer to reduce some of their 
own import barriers or export subsidies in exchange for comparable steps by their 
negotiating partners. Which is best seen in the use of most favoured nation clauses. 54 
The .above trends in the use ofMFN.clauses and other investment treaty protections provides 
a historic context that informs the following theoretical discussion on the MFN clause. This 
49 h!m;//www.globalization 10 1.org/liberalization-of-international-trade/ on 25 September 2017. 
50 https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/restoring-a-global-economy-1950 1980 on 26 September 2017. 
51 https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/restoring-a-global-economy-1950 1980 on 26 September 2017. 
52 http://www.globalizationl Ol .org/liberalization-of-international-trade/ on 25 September 2017. 
53 http://www. globalization I 0 1.org/liberalization-of-international-trade/ on 25 September 2017. 
54 http://www.globalization 10 l .org/liberalization-of-international-trade/ on.25 September 2017. 
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has resulted in an increase in competition between developed countries and developing 
countries to attain some of the benefits brought about through investment treaties. 55 
2.1. Comparative Advantage 
The comparative advantage theory as espoused by Ricardo in his 1817 book "On the Ptinciples 
ofPolitical Economy and Taxation", provides a theoretical framework on international trade. 56 
Comparative advantage occurs when one country can produce a good or service at both a lower 
opportunity cost and in a more efficientmanner than another. 57 This will ensure that both the 
labourer and the material that they are producing are of high quality and produced in an efficient 
manner. 58 An example of this may be seen in cases of oil rich countries which m~y be said to 
have a comparative advantage in chemical production. 59 Oil provides a cheap source of 
material for the chemicals when compared to countries without it.-6° Thus, "Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Mexico compete well with U.S. chemical production firms. 61 
Despite the above efficiency in production and formation of pertinent BITs in trade, this theory 
demonstrates the significance of the MFN Clause in various ways. 62 This theory assumes a 
homogenous level of output and the unquestioned willingness of the labourers to switch from 
one form of production to another. 63 This may be remedied by the MFN clause as the BIT 
ensures that both efficient production and willingness of the labourers is present. 64 In addition 
the politicaL considerations between the two states may be stabilized by the inclusion of the 
MFN clause as negotiated by the countries. 65 It also assumes two products when in reality it is 
numerous products between two countries or more. 66 The MFN clause is an umbrella clause 
that covers all that may be termed as investment. Thus, it covers all possible product or services 
55 BusseM, Koniger J and Nunnenkamp P, 'FDI promotion through bilateral investment treaties: more than a 
bit?' Review of World Economics I Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 146, no. 1 (2010), 149. 
56 http://policoncmics.com/ricardian-trade-theory/ on II September 2017. 
57 https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossarv/comparative-advantage/ on I1 September 2017. 
58 http://www.econlib.org/Jibrarv!Ricardo/ricP2a.html on 11 September 2017. 
59 http://www.econlib.org/library!Ricardo/ricP2a.htrnl on 11 September 2017. 
60 https://www.thebalance.com/comparative-advantage-3305915 on U September 2017 .. 
61 https://www.thebalance.com/comparative-advantage-3305915 on 11 September 2017 .. 
62 Lowenfeild .F.A, 'International Economic Law' 2nd Edn Oxford University Press 2011, 4- 7 
63 Lowenfeild .F.A, 'International Economic Law' 2nd Edn Oxford University Press 2011. 
64 Parker S:L. 'A BIT at a Time:. The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties', The Arbitration Brief2, no. 1 (2012), 64. 
65 Bernard A.B; Redding S. J. and. Schott P.K, 'Comparative Advantage and.Heterogeneous Firms' The Review 
of Economic Studies', Oxford University Press vol. 74, no. 1 (2007), 39. 
66 Hekscher .E, 'The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income' English translation 1949, in 
.Lowenfeil<i.F.A, ~International Economic Law' .2"d Edn Oxford University Press 2011. 
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being provided and protected through the BIT, including dispute resolution provisions. 
Furthermore, it assumes the prices of the production and the products will remain constant over 
time:67 The MFN accounts for price fluctuation by ensuring fair trade practices. 68 Some host 
states have increased the number of BITs they sign as a means of increasing flow of foreign 
direct investment monies within their industries as evidenced in Mexico. 69 Such increase whilst 
being seen through and increase in BITs, is also evident of the apparent security that host 
courtiers may be seen as receiving through the various umbrella clauses, particularly the MFN 
clause.70 
The main shortcoming of this theory is the risk of Dutch disease. 71 This refers to the singularity 
where countries speCialise in producing primary products and doing so they hann the long-
term performance of the economy. 72 Such was the case .in the Netherlands where in the 1970s, 
the country specialised in producing natural gas, and neglected manufacturing and when the 
gas industry declined, the economy was left behind its near neighbours. 73 However, whilst this 
may be possible, the numerous investments that may be covered under a BIT allows for the 
diversity .necessary to keep the economy of both countries growing. 
The above highlights the vulnerability of international trade and the ability ofthe MFN clause 
to provide security against these limitations. The efficiency of the MFN clause is thus hampered 
by the lackofa fixed form and narrow application. However, even in the narrow interpretation 
it is still susceptible to manipulation as seen in Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of 
Spain. 14 Uniformity, if applied, may ensure the different investments are. governed in a manner 
that removes risk by ensuring parties may determine their disputes based not on the direction 
but on the pertinent BIT. 
67 Lowenfeild .F.A, 'International Economic Law' 2nd Edn Oxford University Press 2011. 
68 Lowenfeild .F.A, 'International Economic Law' 2nd Edn Oxford University Press 2011 . 
69 Waldkirch A, 'Comparative advantage FDI? A host country perspective', Review of World Economics I 
Weltwirtschajiliches Archiv, Vol. 147, No.3 (2011),485. 
70 Waldkirch A, 'Comparative advantage FDI? A host country perspective,' 489. 
71 https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/comparative-advantage/ on 11 September 2017. 
72 https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/comparative-advantage/ on 11 September2017. 
73 https://www.economicsbelp.org/blog/glossarv/comparative-advantage/ on 11 September 2017. 
74 Emilio Augustin Ma_ffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID, ARB/9717 Award of 13 November 2001. 
10 
2.1. Conclusion 
E~idence of a comparative advantage in certain BITs has been stated by some tribunals as 
justification for the redefined application of MFN clauses where they are vague or deemed to 
be too limited in the basic BIT.75 However, given the inherent limit of two parties in a BIT 
undermines the purpose of the MFN Clause. This is due to the fact that in a BIT the parties 
have already consented to grant each other's investments favourable treatment, and possibility 
of a 3n1 party gaining more favourable treatment from the basic BIT is not seen. 
75 Emilio Augustin Majfezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Award 39. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Evolution ofMFN Clause through Case Law 
3. Introduction 
Thus far the MFN clause appears to be applicable primarily to the substance of a BIT, that is, 
everything that is considered to be part of the investment. Such primary application may 
however, be extended where parties agree. Essentially, it is a provision in a treaty under which 
a State agrees to accord to the other contracting partner treatment to its investments in the host 
state, that is no less favourable than that which it accords to other or third states. 76 Thus, for 
the clause to function it requires that more favourable treatment is provided to a third state. 77 
The MFN clause would only be applicable to dispute resolution procedure where the parties · 
expressly include it as part of what they both view as 'treatment. 78 ' In order to ascertain whether 
the above separation between substance and procedure is valid we must first concretize what 
is viewed as 'treatment' under the MFN clause. 
The scope of what may be termed as treatment has been defined in two cases, namely in 
Siemens AG v. The Argentine Republic, where the tribunal stated that treatment in its ordinary 
meaning refers to behaviour in respect of an entity or a person. 79 This was further elaborated 
in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA v . The Argentine Republic, where the 
ICSID tribunal stated the following, "the ordinary meaning of that term within the context of 
investment includes the rights and privileges granted and the obligations and burdens imposed 
by a Contracting State on investments made by investors covered by the treaty."80 The tribtmal 
concluded that the term treatment does not exclude the dispute settlement provisions from the 
scope of the MFN clause.81 Despite this open-ended interpretation, in order to be cettain of the 
inclusion of dispute resolution under the MFN clause it must be clear from the parties' 
intention. 
Consequently, in some cases the parties' intention has been clear from the wording of the MFN 
clause itself, as seen in tlie Spain-Argentina BIT. At Article 4 (3) of the Spain-Argentina BIT 
76 Radi Y, 'Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions of BITs', The European Journal of 
International Law Vol. 18, (2007), 759. 
77 Radi Y, 'Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions of BITs', 758. 
78 Radi Y, 'Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions of BITs', 759. 
79 Siemens A. G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/02/8, 2004, 85. 
80 SA.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/03119, 2015, 189. 
81 Radi Y, 'Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions of BITs', 769. 
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MFN treatment was excluded from applying to the following "privileges which either Party 
may grant to investors of a third State by virtue of its participation in a free trade area; a customs 
union; a common market; a regional integration agreement; or an organization of mutual 
economic assistance by virtue of an agreement concluded prior to the ent1y into force of this 
Agreement, containing terms similar to those accorded by that Party to participants of said 
organization." The Suez Tribunal in interpreting this provision stated that the "parties failure 
to refer among these excluded items to any matter remotely connected to dispute settlement 
reinforces the interpretation that the most-favoured-nation clause includes dispute 
settlement."82 Similarly in the UK-Argentina BIT the tribunal in National Grid plc v. The 
Argentine Republic, stated the following, as a "matter of interpretation, specific mention of an 
item excludes others: expression unius est exc/usio alterius (one or more things of a class are 
expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded). 83 " 
This chapter shall explore the evolution of the protection provided by the MFN clause that has 
resulted from the mixed understanding and application of various tribunals. The first part shall 
discuss the parameters of what may be classed as 'treatment' under the MFN clause. The 
second part shall explore the metamorphosis of the MFN clause through an analysis of several 
cases. Beginning with the ICJ decision in the Anglo Iranian Oil Company case, this marked 
the first discussion of the potential expansion of the MFN clause as a means of obtaining 
procedural protections. From this discussion we shall gain an understanding of what exactly 
treatment is and whether or not such extension of the clause may be seen as remaining within 
the parameters of what the MFN clause ought to do. The key objective will be to establish 
whether or not the change in the construction and thereby effect of the MFN clause will indeed 
provide investors the protections they seek. This analysis will be broken up into three thematic 
areas namely, 
1. Emphasis on investor protection 
2. Emphasis on state consent 
3. Emphasis on MFN treatment 
82 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 58. 
83 National Grid pic v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, (2006), 82. 
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3.1. Part I: What 'treatment' falls under the MFN Clause? 
As has been previously stated the exact parameters of what ought to be viewed as treatment 
under the MFN clause was defmed by the Suez tribunal as "the ordinary meaning of that term 
within the context of investment includes the rights and privileges granted and the obligations 
and burdens imposed by a Contracting State on investments made by investors covered by the 
treaty."84 From this statement it may be correct to state. that dispute resolution provisions do 
form an important part of the protection accorded to investors, however, they are not 
substantive protection unless otherwise provided by the parties (emphasis added). 85 Professor 
Sornarajah, states that the purpose of the dispute resolution clause in a BIT is indeed a "major 
step that has been taken to ensure the protection of the foreign investor by enabling him to have 
direct access to a neutral forum for the disputes that could arise between him and the host 
state."86 However, due regard must be given to the parties intention in order to be certain of 
such an inclusion of procedural protection. In some instances the travaux preparatoires and 
subsequent negotiations have been used to ascertain the parties' intentions to include or exclude 
the procedural protection. This was seen after the Siemens Case, Argentina and Panama 
exchange diplomatic notes concerning an 'interpretative declaration' of the MFN clause 
contained in their 1996 investment treaty. 87 It aimed at making it clear that the clause does not 
extend to dispute settlement provisions in the basic BIT. 88 
It is necessary at this stage to detail a clear defmition for due to the apparent separation between 
what may be termed as 'substantive' and 'procedural' protection under the MFN clause. 
Regarding the substantive protection, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, here 
GATT, provides the best non-exhaustive list of what may be seen as substance covered by the 
MFN clause. GATT article 1: 1 states, "World Trade Organization, here WTO, Members to 
extend MFN treatment to like products of other WTO Members regarding tariffs, regulations 
on exports and imports, . internal taxes and charges, and internal regulations. "89 This was 
reiterated in the case of Vladimir Berschader and Moise Berschader v. Russian Federation, 
where the tribunal stated, "it is universally agreed that the very essence of an MFN provision 
in a BIT is to afford to investors all material protection provided by subsequent treaties."90 
84 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic , 189. 
85 Radi Y, 'Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions ofBITs', 769. 
86 Somarajah M, 'The Intemational Law on Foreign Investment', Cambridge University Press (2004), 250. 
87Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A . v. Argentine Republic, 89. 
88 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 89. 
89 Article 1:1, 'General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade 1994 ', 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 33 I.L.M. 1153. 
90 Vladimir Berschader and Moise Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC, 080/2004, 2006, 179. 
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The procedural advantages sought through the use of the MFN clause is the circumvention of 
the pre-arbitration steps provided in the basic BIT. The tribunal in the Siemens case stated that 
such "cherry picking" was a valid use of the MFN cause. 91 It may be correct to state that due 
to the bulk of cases arising from the BITs signed by Argentina, they may be the main agitators 
for the redefmition of the MFN clause. This is buttressed by the pro-extension jurisprudence 
provided by cases where Argentina is a party. In the case of Camuzzi International v. 
Argentina, where Argentina did not bother to argue that the claimant could not use the MFN 
clause to invoke more favourable dispute settlement provisions. 92 This appropriation of the 
core purpose of the MFN clause was affirmed by the tribunal in Gas Natural v. Argentina, case 
where the tribunal stated its use to access dispute resolution procedures was "essential to the 
regime of protection of foreign direct investrnent."93 The tribunal in the National Grid v. 
Argentina94 case went as far as expressly rejecting the narrow application of the MFN clause 
as stated in the Plama 's case. 95 From these cases we see a clear delineation of what is indeed 
substance and procedure. Simply put 'substance' is all the activities made possible by way of 
the BIT, i.e. the activities the investor is investing in. Whereas 'procedure' is that which may 
be relied on to protect such substance by ensuring disputes are determined in accordance with 
pruiies' intention under the basic BIT. The fact of trying to read the procedural advantages into 
the treatment accorded to the investors serves as evidence of the inherent difference of both 
protections. 
3.2.Part II: Evolution ofthe narrow application ofthe MFN clause 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., U.K. v. Iran, Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22). The Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, here APOC, was a British company founded in 1908 following the discovery of 
a large oil field in Masjid-e Solayman near the Persian Gulf.96 It was the first company to 
extract petroleum from Iran when granted concessions to by N~er-al-din Shah Qajar.97 Facts 
of the case are as follows, the Imperial Government of Iran signed a concessions convention 
with the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company dated 29th April1933. This agreement was ratified by 
91 Siemens A. G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID, ARB/02/8 (2004), 109. 
92 Camuzzi International S.A. v. Republica Argentina, ICSID, ARB/03/7 (2005), 17. 
93 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID, ARB/03/1 0 (2005), 29. 
94 National Grid pic v. The Argentine Republic, 84. 
95 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID, ARB/03/24, (2008). 
96 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-company on 8 December 2017. 
97 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-company on 8 December 2017. 
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the Iranian Majlis on 28th May 1933, and came into force on the following day after having 
received formal Imperial assent. On 15th and 20th March 1951, the Iranian Majlis and Senate, 
respectively, passed a law enunciating the principle of nationalization of the oil industry in 
Iran.98 On 28th and 30th, April 1951, they passed another law "concerning the procedure for 
enforcement of the law concerning the nationalization of the oil industry throughout the 
country". 99 These two laws received the Imperial assent on 1st May 1951. As a consequence of 
these laws, a dispute arose between the Government of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, Limited. The Government of the United Kingdom adopted the cause of the British 
Company. 100 It submitted, in virtue of the right of diplomatic protection, an application to the 
International Court of Justice, here ICJ, on 26111 May1951.101 Such application instituted 
proceedings in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland against the Imperial Government of Iran. Article 22 of the concessions 
convention provided that any disputes arising from it between the parties would be submitted 
to arbitration. 102 The Imperial Government of Iran ignored this and instead sought to have the 
company nationalised. This was to occur through the implementation of the Iranian National 
Oil Act 1951.103 This would result in a unilateral terinination of the articles of the convention 
signed between Imperial Government ofPersia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 104 
In response, the Imperial Government of Iran submitted that the claims were inadmissible and 
the court lacked jurisdiction to determine the substantive merits of the claim. The court's 
jurisdiction fell short as the Imperial Government of Iran had denounced its declaration to 
adhere to Article 36 of the ICJ statute.105 The Imperial Government submitted that the court 
ought to declare that it lacks jurisdiction ex officio by applying "Article 2, paragraph 7, of the 
Charter of the United Nations. The matters dealt with by the Nationalization Laws of 20th 
March and May 1951, were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran and incapable 
of being the subject of an intervention by any organ of the United Nations. The United 
Kingdom Government sought to base its claim on other agreements signed between Iran and 
other Sovereign nations. Such would only be possible through, the benefit of which can only 
98 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-compan on 2 April2018. 
99 http://www.irarncaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-compan on 2 April2018. 
100 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 95. 
101 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-compan on 2 April20 18. 
102Atticle 22, D'Arcy oil concession, 1901. 
103 !raman National Oil Act 1951. 
104 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 95. 
105 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 96. 
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be invoked by the United Kingdom by applying the most-favoured-nation clause. Effectively, 
the UK sought to use of the MFN Clause to borrow more favourable dispute settlement 
provisions from 3rd part treaties signed by Iran. This clause appears only in the treaties 
concluded between Iran and the United Kingdom in 1857 and 1903. Both occurring prior to 
the ratification of the Iranian Declaration, thus falling outside of the court's jurisdiction 
[Emphasis addedV 06 It was on this key point that the ICJ first pronounced the narrow 
application of the MFN clause to only substance and effectively barred resort to other 3rd party 
treaties that had no legal obligation under the basic BIT. 
The court took the above into consideration as well as the statute of the Court in finding that 
its jurisdiction was based solely on Article 36 (2) of the ICJ statute, on condition of 
reciprocity. 107 In this case the UK had signed on 28th February 1940, Iran signed on 2nd October 
1930, and ratified on 19th September 1932.108 As such the jurisdiction of the court would be 
limited to the extent in which the declarations coincided in conferring it. 109 The Iranian 
Declaration was found to be much more limited in scope than that of the UK. The Court was 
of the opinion that the provision ought to be interpreted as it stands, with regard of the words 
actually used. This went against the UK Government assertions that the legal text ought to be 
interpreted in a manner that would attribute meaning to every word [emphasis added]. 110 The 
Court thus decided that its jurisdiction was only applicable to the conventions accepted by Iran 
after the ratification of the Declaration. 
The UK Government argued that by means of the protection granted by the MFN clause in the 
their material treaty, the international law obligations that Iran had agreed not to breach in its 
treaty with Denmark would also apply to the UK. 111 The Court stated without hesitation that it 
would not accept such contentions. 112 Furthermore, it elaborated that in order for the UK to 
benefit from third party treaties it had to be in a position to invoke the third party treaty. The 
court placed further emphasis on the requisite locus standi by stating, "A third-party treaty, 
independent of and isolated from the basic treaty, cannot produce any legal effect as between 
106 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 98. 
107 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 98. 
108 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 98. 
109 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 98. 
110 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 99. 
111 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 99. 
112 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection, 99. 
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the United Kingdom and Iran: it is res inter alios acta," a thing done between others does not 
harm or benefit others. 113 Essentially, if the court had allowed the UK to benefit from the Iran 
- Denmark treaty, it would have amounted to benefiting from others. Thus the court in 
concluding stated that "no treaty concluded by Iran with any third party can be relied upon by 
the United Kingdom in the present case."114 The court's decision to accept the Imperial 
Government of Iran's arguments led to the court lacking requisite jurisdiction to detennine the 
substantive issue. Essentially, the courts sentiments may be understood as requiring evidence 
of a legal tie to the 3rd party treaty and such must result in a substantive advantage in order for 
the MFN clause to be validly extended. 
The significance of the Anglo Iranian Oil Case lies in the fact that it essentially opened the 
floor to discussion on how far the protections of the MFN clause may legally be extended. 
Despite the conclusively strict application of the court, a number of tribunals have deviated 
from the courts sentiments and decided that the MFN clause will in fact apply to both substance 
and procedure. This may be seen as a drastic deviation from the widely accepted purely 
substantive protection unless otherwise stated. 115The metamorphosis of the MFN clause can be 
seen in three distinct manners, they include; 
1. Emphasis on Investor protection 
2. Emphasis on State consent 
3. Emphasis on MFN treatment 
3.2.2. Asian Agricultural Product Limited v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No 
ARB/87/3 
This is the first instance where the MFN clause may be varied with an emphasis being placed 
on investor protection. 116 The effect of this is that all investors covered under one BIT are all 
entitled to the same rights and benefits. 117 Thus, if there is both procedural and substantive 
protection covered under the MFN clause then it will be applied to all investors. 118 This was 
explored in the case of Asian Agricultural Product v. Republic of Sri Lanka, which went a step 
113 https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Res+inter+alios+acta on 15 January 018. 
114 Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection 99. 
115 Parker S.L, 'A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties', 35. 
116 MFN Study group, 'Part III: Considerations in fntetpreting MFN Clause', A/70/1 0, 32. 
117 MFN Study group, 'Part Ill: Considerations in fntetpreting MFN Clause', A/70/1 0, 32. 
118 MFN Study group, 'Part III: Considerations in Intetpreting MFN Clause', A/70/10, 32. 
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further and added a provision, that there must be a substantive benefit to be gained in a 3rd party 
BIT for it to be relied on by parties who have no legal ties to the 3rd BIT. 119 The case involved, 
a Hong Kong corporation AAPL, which owned 48.2% of Serendib, a Sri Lankan joint venture 
company that was formed to cultivate and export shrimp to Japan. Serendib made only two 
shipments of shrimp when its principal facility, a shrimp farm, was destroyed as a result of 
counter-insurgency operation of the Sri-Lankan Security Forces. This resulted, in Serendib 
going out of business and thus AAPL's investment was lost. The Claimant, sought to rely on 
the Sri Lanka-Switzerland BIT which according to the claimant, contained procedural rules 
more favourable than those provided under the Sri Lanka-UK BIT. The tribunal rejected this 
and found that there was no substantial benefit to be gained in the 3rd BIT, namely the Sri 
Lanka-Switzerland BIT. For this reason the tribunal dismissed the Claimant claim under Article 
2 on "Full protection and security". 
This tribunal can be said to be interpreting the protection accorded to investors by the MFN 
Clause as purely substantive. As such it would only be valid to extend such substance to 
procedure only where there is a substantial benefit to be gained from the 3rd party treaty. It 
would be correct to state that the tribunal is in fact applying the comparative advantage theory 
in its analysis of the instances where reliance on a 3rd party BIT outside of the pertinent BIT 
may be acceptable. This is especially seen in the stress on the need for there to be a "substantive 
advantage" to be gained from the other BIT. The comparative advantage is seen in the fact that 
a 3rd party BIT permits a leapfrog approach to dispute resolution which the availability of better 
tribunals or simply provided for more expansive protections to investors and their investment. 
This may also be said to reinforce the original purely substantive nature of the MFN clause in 
that the tribunal will only allow for such expansion where it is seeking to incorporate not the 
dispute resolution procedure but the substantive protections in a 3rd party BIT. 
3.2.3. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States. ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)I00/2. 
The second condition placed on the expansion of the MFN clause places an emphasis on State 
consent. This concept provides that the MFN clause can be seen as state consent to arbitrate, 
absence of the clause would be seen as a lack of consent to arbitrate. 120 This was traversed in, 
11~FN Study group, 'Part Ill: Considerations in Interpreting MFN Clause', A/70/l 0, 32. 
120 MFN Study group, Part Ill: Considerations in Interpreting MFN Clause, A/70/1 0, 32. 
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Tecnicas Medioambientales Tacmed S.A. ("Teemed") v. Mexico. 121 The facts were, a Spanish 
company, Cytrar, S.A. de C.V, was expropriated by Mexico by refusing to renew Cytrar's 
annual license to run a hazardous industrial waste landfill. The investor, a Spanish company, 
in this case relied on the rules in the BIT between Spain and Mexico. The claimant, attempted 
to expand the jurisdiction ofthe Tribunal to settle a dispute before the pertinent BIT came into 
force. 122 This attempt was rejected by the tribunal as only the pertinent BIT could provide the 
state consent to the tribunal's jurisdiction over the material aspects of the claim to be 
determined. 123 Thus, in this instance the court stated that the dispute was governed by national 
law ofMex.ico and not international law principles such as the MFN clause. 
The above position was revisited in the case of, Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. 
Jordan. 124 In this instance the tribunal attempted to limit the possibility of forum shopping 
through the use ofMFN clauses. The dispute concerned the construction of a dam in Jordan 
and was submitted to the ISCID tribunal by the Italian Claimant. The dispute settlement 
provision in the basic BIT provided first of amicable resolution then where the dispute is not 
determined, resort to national courts and then ICSID Arbitration. However, Article 9(2) of the 
basic BIT provided that "in case the investor and an entity of the Contracting Parties have 
stipulated an investment Agreement, the procedure foreseen in such investment agreement 
shall apply."125 The investment contract provided for the same progress through the negotiation 
then national courts but provided that the arbitration would be instituted once both parties had 
consented to such. 126 The Claimants sought to rely on the MFN clause of the basic treaty in . 
order to invoke the comparatively more advantageous dispute settlement provisions of the 
Jordan-United States BIT. This 3ro party BIT provided investors with leave to approach an 
ICSID tribunal "regardless of any clause in the investment agreement providing for a different 
dispute settlement mechanism."127 If accepted, this would not only provide the Claimant the 
dispute settlement procedures they preferred, but would also grant the tribunal jurisdiction over 
claims it had no jurisdiction over under the basic BIT. Tribunal held, that generally MFN 
clauses should not be read to apply to dispute resolution clause, unless the parties had consented 
to such inclusion. In the present case "The Claimants have submitted nothing from which it 
121 Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID, ARB (AF)/00/2, 2003. 
122 Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, SA. v. The United Mexican States, 64. 
123 Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, SA. v. The United Mexican States, 64. 
124 Salini Costruttori Sp.A. and Italstrade Sp.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSTD, ARB/02/13, 2004. 
125Salini Costruttori Sp.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 70. 
126 Salini Costmttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 71 . 
127 Salini Costmttori S.p.A. and Italstrade Sp.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 23-36. 
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might be established that the common intention of the Parties was to have the most-favoured-
nation clause apply to dispute settlement."128 Thus there would be no extension of the MFN 
clause the dispute resolution procedure in the Jordan-USA BIT. 
It is interesting to see the tribunal did not consider the potential advantages accorded to either 
the state of the investor but rather based its decision on what is considered to be the cornerstone 
of arbitration, consent. This may be evidenced in the nature of arbitration which thrives because 
of the party autonomy in the dispute and for such to exist there must be consent of both parties 
in order for the proceedings to carry on. The tribunal stressed that the circumstances in this 
case were different in that "the common intention of the Parties' Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan 
BIT could not be extended as the text of the MFN clause which did not refer to 'all matters' .''129 
Whist it may not have been expressly stated it may be inferred form the tribunals sentiments 
that such expansion would not be permitted as the MFN Clause in the basic BIT was a narrow 
clause.B0 This is so due to the fact that the MFN clause in the 3rd party treaty namely, Jordan-
United State BIT, did not cover "all matters" arising from the BIT and the investment contract. 
3.3 .Emphasis on MFN treatment 
The finding that international investment arbitration is indeed parts of the rights and protections 
given to the investors. 131 This may have nothing to do with the MFN clause but has more to do 
with the primary investment regime of the states involved. Simply put in some areas the 
investment regime requires a different understanding and application of the MFN clause e.g. 
Argentina with its expansive understanding and construction of the MFN clause. However, 
from the case law above it may be correct to state that the elements of clear substantive 
advantage, party consent and considerations of the subject matter of the dispute, provide valid 
grounds for expansion of the MFN Clause to benefit both substantively and procedurally from 
a 3rd party BIT. 
128 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 119. 
129Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and ltalstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 114. 
130 Parker S.L, 'A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties', 35 . 
131 Nguy~n T.T, 'Most Favoured Nation Clause in Investment Treaties', 22. 
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3.4.Conclusion 
This growth of the MFN provision from the stance of the ICJ to the considerations of the 
various investment tribunals may be examined by observing the difference between the 
substantive and procedural elements of the provision. 132 This was argued in the case of 
Roslnvest UK v. The Russian Federation, where the Respondent stated that there was a 
distinction between substantive and procedural matters in international contracts. 133 The fact 
that this matter was premised on a contract rather than a treaty does not take away from the 
validity of the tribunals proclamations. Thus, substantive protections as provided by the MFN 
clause deal with the crux of the matter. 134 Where read in accordance with the ejusdem generis 
principle it ought to ensure that only substantive benefits of the same kind may in fact be 
borrowed fi·om other BITs. 135 In addition to this, such benefits shall only be applied where 
there is, a clear benefit in the secondary BIT rather than the primary BIT. 136 Where there is 
clear and unequivocal state consent to the use ofMFN clauses to borrow provisions from other 
third party BITs. 137 Lastly, access to an investment arbitration body or institute is must be 
covered under the understanding of treatment. 138 Only when these three elements are present 
will there be a valid extension of the provisions of the MFN clause to procedural protections. 
Furthermore such may not in these fringe occurrences be classed as an extension but rather as 
what the clause when practically applied, ought to do. However, where the above are not 
present then the ejusdem generis principle prevents the extension of the function of the 
provision. 139 
132 8003, 'Most Favoured Nation Treatment Application in International Investment Arbitration: A Study on 
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Oslo, 12 January 2011, 50. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Consequence of Mixed Interpretation of the MFN Clause 
4. Introduction 
Thus far, we have seen from a critical analysis of various tribunal decisions, the MFN clause 
whilst universally agreed, as a largely substantive protection, may indeed be extended to 
include procedural protections. Such extension may occur only in select instances, primarily 
where the parties consent to such and where there is a clear substantive benefit to be gained 
from the 3rd party BIT. The Maffezini case provided the first break in this tradition. It is 
important to note that the tribunal warned against the use of the MFN clause to "override public 
policy considerations that the contracting parties might have envisaged as fundamental 
conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in question, particularly if the beneficiary is a 
private investor, as will often be the case. The scope of the clause might thus be narrower than 
it appears at first sight". 140 The tribunal went further and provided instances in which, 
extension of the MFN clause to dispute settlement procedure would be inappropriate. 141 These 
instances include; 
1. Where one Contracting Party has conditioned its consent to arbitration on the 
exhaustion of local remedies, and such is a reflection of a fundamental rule of 
international law, 
2. Where the parties had agreed to a dispute settlement arrangement which includes "fork 
in the road" provision, disruption of such a provision would undermine the finality of 
the entire BIT, 
3. Where the parties have agreed to a highly institutionalized system of arbitration that 
incorporates precise rules of procedure, such specificity reflects the intentions of 
contracting parties on the particular means of dispute settlement they wish to subject 
their disputes to. 142 
The overriding sentiment in the above exceptions to MFN invocation according to the 
Maffezini tribunal is contracting parties consent and intention. In order to uphold privity of 
contract it is necessary for a tribunal to take into account parties intention and the actual words 
of the MFN clause as they determine on whether or not the MFN clause may be extended. It is 
140 Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, 62. 
141 MFN Study group, Part III: Considerations in Interpreting MFN Clause, N70/l 0, 34. 
142Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, 63. 
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due to the interplay between these two areas that the rules of interpretation as per the VCLT 
may be applied. In order to reach a correct conclusion with the above considerations it is 
necessary for tribunals to remember given the circumstances of each case, to deny extension 
may be seen as breach of the rights accorded to the investor as was stated in the case of 
Winters hall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic. 143 With this understanding, we proceed 
in this chapter with a discussion on the contemporary understanding of the MFN clause in a 
BIT. This chapter shall detail the centrality of the clause through an examination of the different 
means of interpretation available to tribunals. The objective of such examination will be to 
ascertain whether or not more harm is done by including the MFN Clause in the basic BIT 
rather than excluding it all together. 
4.l.Objective interpretation 
Due regard must be given to the actual words of the MFN Clause in order to achieve a valid 
interpretation as whilst maintaining parties freedom of contract. 144 Consequently, the 
interpretation of any particular MFN provision must be in accordance with articles 31 and 32 
of the VCLT. Article 31 provides for the starting point is to be the ordinary meaning of the 
words. This is informed by three principle elements, namely, that is wording, object and 
purpose, when interpreting a treaty. 145 Such interpretation seeks to legitimise the parties' 
intentions. Intentions as expressed during negotiation and concretized during drafting and 
signing of the final BIT and investment contract. Despite, the resulting confusion, the Maffezini 
Tribunal reached the correct determination on the extension ofthe MFN Clause as it was within 
the object and purpose of the basic BIT, namely the "intention to create favourable condition 
for investments."146 
These sentiments have not always been upheld, as seen in the case of Plama Consortium 
Limited v. Bulgaria. 147 The dispute involved Cypriot investors claim that the public authorities 
in Bulgaria deliberately caused difficulties resulting in material damage to the company that 
143 Wintershall Aktiengesellsclzaft v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04114, (2008) 61. 
144 8003, Most Favoured Nation Treatment Application in International Investment Arbitration: A Study on 
Conflicting Precedence in International Dispute Settlement Procedure, Unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
Oslo, 12 January 2011, 60. · 
145 Smiding E, 'Just how favoured is most favoured? Establishing international arbitral tribunal jurisdiction in 
investor state disputes throught most favoured nation clauses under Bilateral investment treaties', Masters thesis, 
University of Lund, 29. 
146 Preamble, Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the reciprocal promotion 
and protection oflnvestments, 28 September 1992, 1699, 1-29403 
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was being purchased. The claimant sought to relay on the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT, which was 
limited to ad hoc ICSID tribunals. Whose jurisdiction was further limited to determination of 
compensation due to investor following the Bulgarian national courts determination on 
liability. Claimant sought to rely mainly on the Bulgaria-Finland BIT which provided the 
arbitration tribunal with a larger class of disputes. 
The tribunal in this instance distanced itself from the tribunal's sentiments in Maffezini and 
provided the following rule, "The MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by 
reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the 
MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to 
incorporate them [emphasis added]."148 MFN clause at issue in Plama did not meet such a high 
standard as regards parties' intent and was hence not held to be a legitimate consent to submit 
a dispute under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT to ICSID arbitration. 149 The tribunal riled on 
negotiations between the parties where they sought to amend the basic BIT. The negotiations 
failed but it was the contemplation of revision the dispute settlement provisions of the basic 
BIT that the tribunal used as a means of inferring the parties intent not expand the MFN 
protection to allow invocation of 3rd party BITs. 150 In doing so the tribunal expressed itself 
thus, "it can be inferred from these negotiations that the Contracting Parties to the BIT 
themselves did not consider that the MFN provision extends to dispute settlement provisions 
in other BITs."151 The tribunal went further than the provided boundaries of Article 31 by 
looking at not at the words in the basic Bit but by inferring from witness statements the parties' 
lack of intention. This may faU within the preview of Article 32, had the reading of the words 
as pert Article 31 resulted in absurdity. This cannot be said to have been the case in the present 
case of Plama as such it may be correct to state that the tribunal in this instance went too far to 
justify their narrow interpretation of the MFN clause in the basic BIT. 
4 .2. Tel eo logical Interpretation 
Tribunals may apply Article 32 of the VCLT as a means of reaching an internationalist analysis 
which buttresses the ordinary meaning or where such meaning would give rise to an 
148 Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, 227 . 
. 
149 Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, 227. 
150 Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, 195. 
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absurdity. 152 As such it provides the legislative backing for a tribunal to deny the extension of 
the MFN clause for reasons it finds manifestly absurd. Manifest absurdity is exemplified in the 
case of M C./. Power Group L. C and New Turbine, Inc v. Republic of Ecuador. 153 The Claimant 
sought to invoke an earlier entry into force date from the 3rd party treaty. 154 Whilst this may 
not pertain to dispute resolution procedure it does demonstrate what may be termed as a 
manifest absurdity.155 Had such a prayer been granted the claimant would gain locus standi 
from a treaty that was yet to come into force. This would also be a breach of Article 18 of the 
VCLT which calls for states to "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty."156 In White Industries v. India. 157 The arbitral tribunal established in accordance 
with United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, here UNCITRAL rules accepted 
the import from the India-Kuwait BIT of an obligation to "provide effective means of asserting 
claims and enforcing rights" into the India-Australia BIT. 158 The tribunal held, such 
incorporation did "not "subvert" the negotiated balance of the BIT. Instead, it achieves exactly 
the result which the parties intended by the inclusion of the MFN clause."159 Such result whilst 
relying on an inference of the parties' intention is seen to result in an affirmation ofthe object 
and purpose interpretation provided at Article 31 VCLT. 
4.3.Conclusion 
From the various interpretive considerations sited above it may be correct to state that a more 
expansive reading of the MFN clause ought not to be limited to the instances discussed in the 
case law above. 160 Such has been the sentiment of some public policy commentators on the 
apparent evolution of the MFN Clause. Scholz, states that there would be little to no purpose 
of inclusion of the MFN Clause in a BIT where its protection is limited to only substantive 
protection.161 Scholz sites the statement of the tribunal in ADF Group Inc. v. Unites States of 
152 Article 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
153 MC.I. Power Group L.C and New Turbine, Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID ARB/03/6, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment, July 31,2007. 
154 M.C.I. Power Group. L.C. , Decision on the Application for Annulment, Section B. 
155 M. C./. Power Group. L. C. Decision on the Application for Annulment, Section B. 
156 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Preliminary Objection 93. 
151White Industries v India, UNCITRAL Final Award of 30 Nov 2011. 
158White Industries v India, Final Award 26. 
159White Industries v India, Final Award 30. 
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America, where the tribunal concluded that the previous restrictive findings of tribunals wrong 
and had failed to give investors sufficient guidance upon which to rely on. 162 It is based on such 
sentiments that this study proposes a redefinition of the MFN Clause as not one narrowly 
understood as only substance. Rather the redefinition would affirm the sentiments of the 
Argentinian understanding of the MFN Clause as including both substance and procedure in 
order to ensure the object and purpose of every BIT is achieved. However, this should not be 
understood as the automatic reading of procedural advantage as being covered by the MFN 
clause. Such interpretation must be ascertained through an application of objective and 
teleological interpretation coupled with the apparent comparative advantage to be gained from 
the 3rd party BIT. However, with regard to BITs it may be necessary to remove the clause in 
its entirety as the parties have essentially agreed to confer more favourable treatment to each 
other's investments. Simply put the "MFN clause must be used to its proper and full potential, 
both by tribunals and by treaty drafters. To achieve this, MFN clauses can be invoked to import 
more favourable dispute settlement provisions of third party treaties under the VCLT."163 
162 ADF Group Inc. v. Unites States of America, ICSID ARB (AF)/0011, Award 2003. 
163 Parker, S.L, 'A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties' 62. 
27 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
5. Introduction 
The first chapter presented the historic development of the MFN Clause as a tool to further 
ensure better protections were given to all investors over the obvious advantages given to more 
developed nations. 164 It stated the purpose of the present study as an examination of the MFN 
clause and the consequences that may arise when it is expanded to include both substantive and 
procedural protections. Furthermore, it provided an introductory defmition of the MFN clause 
as contained in the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Foreign Investment at Article 3. 
It states, "Each Party shall at all times ensure the observance of any undertakings which it may 
have given in relation to investments made by nationals of any other party." 165 
Chapter two, discussed the main theory that informs the evolution of the MFN clause. Namely, 
the economic theory of Comparative advantage. This theory as espoused by Ricardo provides 
that where "a country is relatively more efficient in the production of a good than another 
country then we say that it has comparative advantage in production of that good."166 Countries 
who have comparative advantages in production of different goods ought to enter into BITs so 
as to ensure efficient production of goods and services and an efficient use of resources. With 
regards to MFN provisions, it may be comparatively more advantageous for one state to borrow 
the provisions of a 3rd party BIT that does indeed provide a substantive advantage over the 
basic BIT. Such substantive benefit must not be alleged but proved to exist, where this does 
not occur there can be no extension. 167 
Chapter three, analysed the evolution of the use of the MFN clause from the first instance it 
was discussed in the Anglo Iranian Oil case. This whilst not involving a BIT did act as a curtain 
raiser for the discussion on the potential expansive reading of the MFN clause. This was 
followed by the various areas of emphasis in which various tribunals either permitted it or 
164 Vesel, 'Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties', 12. 
165 Katia Yannaca-Small, 'International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations' 
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rejected its application for various reasons. Most notable was the requirement imposed on the 
necessity of a substantive advantage and party consent as regards dispute settlement provisions. 
Chapter four, looked at the various means of interpretation that the tribunals use in reaching 
their determination on the requested expansion of the MFN clause by the claimant. The key 
considerations in this area are the customary international rules on interpretation of treaties as 
provided by the VCLT. Objective interpretation provides for a clear reading of the words in 
their ordinary meaning, however, such reading must give effect to the parties' intentions. 
Whereas teleological is to only be restored to where an ontological reading may give to an 
absurd result. 
5 .!.Recommendations 
The following recommendations may be implemented: 
1. Uniform MFN Clauses - This may be achieved by having model provisions that clearly 
delineates .the matters covers under most favoured nation treatment. Countries may 
adopt different forms of a model law on BITs. The model MFN clauses may explicitly 
affirm their application to dispute resolution mechanisms. 168 Essentially, it should be 
clearly stated from the onset, either the grounds that may validate the extension or the 
automatic inclusion of dispute provisions under the MFN clause. This has been applied 
in the UK Model BIT which at Article 3(3) states, "For avoidance of doubt MFN 
treatment shall apply to certain specified provisions of the BIT including the dispute 
settlement provision."169 
2. Negotiable and non-negotiable elements of the MFN Clause- Where parties expressly 
include the dispute resolution mechanisms they may make certain elements negotiable. 
Negotiable conditions may include the waiting period between the negotiations over a 
dispute and the recourse to either the national court or an arbitral tribunal of the parties 
liking. The non-negotiable elements may be the limitation of the MFN protection only 
to the substantive protection. This has been adopted by Canada and the European Union 
in their Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, here CET A where the parties 
provide as follows, "For greater certainty, the "treatment" . . . does not include 
168 Parker, S.L. "A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties", 35 
169 Nikiema Suzy H., 'The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause in Investment Treaties IISD Best Practices Series', 
February 2017, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 25 
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procedures for the resolution of investment disputes between investors and states 
provided for in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements. 
Substantive obligations in other international investment treaties and other trade 
agreements do not in themselves constitute "treatment", and thus cannot give rise to a 
breach of this Article, absent measures adopted or maintained by a Party pursuant to 
those obligations."170 
3. Removal of the MFN Clause from BITs- complete exclusion of the MFN clause would 
mean none of the issues currently faced pertaining to the clause ever come up for 
determination before any tribunals and courts. 171 
4. Interpretive declaration - where a country insists on inclusion of the MFN Clause they 
must also enter interpretative reservations where they take the MFN clause to be 
anything more than purely substantive.172 This allows the MFN principle to remain 
effective and provide substantive protection without limiting the potential inclusion of 
procedural protection. 
170 Article 8.7.4, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 7 May 2016,2016/0220 (NLE). 
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